Poland and North Korean in the 1980's : from partnership to stagnancy by Hańderek, Marek
25
Poland and North Korea in the 1980’s – 
from Partnership to Stagnancy
Marek Hańderek
Previous decades
Poland recognized the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on October 9, 
1948. It was a natural consequence of belonging of both states to the Communist 
Bloc led by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Poland did not accept the existence 
of the Republic of Korea and for decades agreed with North Korean claims saying 
that Koreans in the South were occupied by the US Army and ruled by “American 
puppets”. This point of view has been revised in the 1980’ and finally on November 
1, 1989 Poland established diplomatic relations with South Korea.
In my paper I am going to describe Polish-North Korean relations in the 1980’s. 
Up till today, scholars have not paid enough attention to this issue1. First of all I 
am going to draw a short historical background of the subject. In previous decades 
Communist Poland supported North Korea on many fields. After the outbreak of the 
Korean War, propaganda in Poland consequently presented North Korean version 
of events. Accusations towards the Americans and South Koreans of invading the 
North and using biological weapon were common in the media. What is more, 
sometimes Americans were even compared to Nazi-German war criminals.  An 
anti-American attitude could be noticed not only in the state-run media but also in 
literature – novels and poems, sometimes written by outstanding Polish authors like 
Wisława Szymborska and Tadeusz Różewicz2. During the war, alike several other 
Communist countries, Poland gave material aid to DPRK and agreed to give shelter 
to 1200 North Korean orphans who came to Poland in two stages: in November 
1951 and in July 19533. 
1 See short analytics of chosen 3 documents related to the 1980’: S. Szyc, Stosunki polsko-
północnokoreańskie w latach 80-tych XX wieku w świetle wybranych dokumentów, „Komunizm: 
system-ludzie-dokumentacja”, vol. 3, 2014, pp. 221–237. 
2 Choi Sung Eun, Koreańska wojna domowa w polskich socrealistycznych utworach 
literackich, [in] „Korea w oczach Polaków”, ed. J. Włodarski, K. Zeidler, M. Burdelski, Gdańsk 
2013, pp. 545–551. 
3 There is several articles in Polish related to problem of North Korean orphans in Poland. 
See for example: S. Szyc, Północnokoreańskie dzieci oraz młodzież w Państwowym Ośrodku 
Wychowawczym w Płakowicach na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1953–1959 [in] Rodzina: powołanie, 
zadania, zagrożenia, ed. Ks. J. Zimny, Stalowa Wola 2014, pp. 1045–1054; Ł. Sołtysik, Dzieci i 
młodzież północnokoreańska w Polsce w latach 1953–1954 w świetle wybranych dokumentów, 
„Rocznik Jeleniogórski” 2009, vol. 41, pp. 195–210. 
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In the first years after signing of the armistice Polish-North Korean relations 
were still close and warm. Poland together with Czechoslovakia was chosen by 
North Korea and Peoples Republic of China to become a member of the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission and Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. 
Nevertheless, both countries were not neutral and represented interests of North 
Korea and China. Moreover, the Polish delegation used NNSC as a cover institution 
for activities of its intelligence and collected data concerning the US military in 
South Korea and in the Far East4. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which 
as supervisory bodies had access to 5 crucial South Korean ports until June 1956, 
were especially useful for this kind of activity5. It is worth mentioning that from 
1951 until 1955 Polish military intelligence was fully subordinated to the Soviet 
Union and headed by high rank Soviet officers6. 
Poland also took part, together with other Communist states, in post-war 
reconstruction of North Korea. Poland fully equipped hospital in Huichon, obliged 
itself to build steam engine and carriage workshop in Pyongyang and a rolling-stock 
workshop in Wonsan. What is more, Poland decided to implement mechanization 
of three coal mines and, last but not least, Polish urbanists developed the plan of the 
city and two housing projects7. 
Visit of Kim Il Sung from 2–6 July 1956 confirmed good mutual relations. It 
was a part of his 50-day journey to Communist countries in order to receive more 
help needed to implement Five-Year Plan aimed to grow the economy. In April 
1957, Polish delegation led by Prime-minister Józef Cyrankiewicz revisited North 
Korea. One and half year later, in October 1959, delegation led by head of the State 
Council Aleksander Zawadzki went to DPRK. Despite the positive atmosphere of 
the visit, first symptoms of distrust towards Poland were visible. In his report Polish 
ambassador to North Korea Józef Dryglas stressed that absence of Kim Il Sung 
during each public meeting with the delegation was meaningful8. 
Indeed, since late 50’s Polish-North Korean relationships became colder. It 
was connected with events inside the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin’s death and 
4 See an example of the data collected by the intelligence officers under cover of the 
NNSC: AIPN, 2602/2904, [Notatka dla tow. Kotowskiego], 10 XII 1953 r. 
5 After withdrawal of the Inspection Teams from South Korea and then from North Korea, 
the role of the NNSC dramatically decreased. Since that time it only observed situation in the 
Demilitarized Zone and received reports about violations of the armistice, but had no tools 
to respond effectively. Poles were forced to leave North Korea in 1995 and since that time 
representatives of the NNSC have no access to DPRK. See more on the NNSC: Ch. Birchmaier, 
M. Burdelski, E. Jendraszczak, 50-lecie Komisji Nadzorczej Państw Neutralnych w Korei, 
Warsaw 2003.
6 S. Cenckiewicz, Długie ramię Moskwy. Wywiad wojskowy Polski Ludowej 1943–1991¸ 
Poznan 2011, pp. 86-87. 
7 AMSZ, zesp. 12, w. 41, t. 994, Stosunki polsko-koreańskie, p. 8–11. 
8 AMSZ, zesp. 12, w. 41, teczka 994, Notatka informacyjna z pobytu w KRLD tow. 
Aleksandra Zawadzkiego i delegacji rządowej PRL, Phenian, 30 X 1959 r., k. 41–43. 
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its repercussions for the Communist Bloc. On one hand, when Nikita Khrushchev 
pointed out Stalin’s crimes and critique of the cult of individual it resulted in 
political thaw in several Communist countries, including Poland. On the other hand, 
a few prominent Communist politicians as Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung perceived 
Khrushchev’s attitude as a potential threat to their positions. In the aftermath these 
events, the Sino-Soviet split began and soon the Communist camp was divided. 
North Korea supported China, while Poland stayed loyal to the Soviet Union9. 
In the Era of the Sino-Soviet split and the birth of the Juche ideology, in the 
1960’s and 1970’s, relations between Poland and DPRK were stagnant. According 
to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the period 1963–1966 was the worst period 
time in mutual relations10. Until the late 1970’s the Polish embassy in Pyongyang 
regularly informed about constant stagnancy11. At the same time Polish members 
of the NNSC reported signs of lack of trust from the North Koreans who perceived 
the Poles as representatives of Soviet interests12. 
Polish documents from that period show that leaders of the state did not 
pay attention to the DPRK and sometimes even ignored its initiatives. In 1972 
North Korea invited First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United 
Worker’s Party Edward Gierek to visit DPRK. In the following years DPRK asked 
several times about his plans and in October 1977 its ambassador on a behalf of Kim 
Il Sung repeated the invitation13. The much awaited visit of the Polish leader was a 
very important issue for North Koreans and they underlined their expectations even 
after visits of 1977 when two prominent figures: the Minister of National Defense 
general Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Emil Wojtaszek 
travelled to North Korea14. In spite of North Korean efforts, Gierek did not come, 
and until 1986 Poland did not send any delegation with the First Secretary of the 
ruling party. 
There were also other issues that somehow disappointed North Koreans. They 
complained that the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United 
Worker’s Party has never received the ambassador of the DPRK. Such information 
was provided in report of the Polish ambassador Jerzy Pękala, who in February 
9 See more on Polish-North Korean relations until 1961: S. Szyc, The relations between 
Poland and North Korea in 1948–1961, “Progress. Journal of Young Researchers”, vol. 2, 
2017, pp. 123–136.
10 AMSZ, D. II, 27/90, w. 4, Notatka nt. stosunków polsko-koreańskich, Warszawa, 15 X 
1985.
11 AMSZ, D. II 11/79, w. 4, Ambasada PRL w Phenianie. Raport okresowy za m – c 
czerwiec 1976 r.
12 AMSZ, D. II, 8/77, w. 5, Sprawozdanie z działalności Szefa Misji Polskiej do KNPN w 
Korei za okres od 21. 09. 1971 do 31. 10. 1972 r., Warszawa, 30 XI 1972. 
13 AMSZ, D. II, 29/87, w. 2, Wydział Zagraniczny KC PZPR. Notatka, Warszawa, 19 X 
1977. 
14  AMSZ, D. II, 38/86, w. 4, Jerzy Pękala. Sprawozdanie z pobytu na placówce dyploma- 
tycznej w Koreańskiej Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej od dnia 2 VII 1978 do 14 XI 1981, 
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1981 summed up his three and a half year service in Pyongyang. He added that at 
the same time North Korean politicians stressed that Kim Il Sung has met each of 
the Polish ambassadors to North Korea15. 
From a position of a Soviet-dependent state Polish diplomats pointed out in 
many documents numerous North Korean moves that made DPRK a trustworthy 
partner not only for Poland but also for other Communist states subordinated to 
Moscow. Crucial arguments were listed in document written by the deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Ernest Kucza just before Kim Il Sung’s second trip to Poland. 
Kucza mentioned a specific North Korean way of strengthening socialism like the 
cult of personality and the Juche ideology, a foreign policy focused mainly on the 
state’s own particular goals, a neutral attitude towards the Chinese attack on Vietnam 
in 1979 and in general a negative stance on Vietnam16. It is worth noting that under 
Soviet pressure Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic 
postponed visits of North Korean Minister of Defense planned for autumn 1978. 
The main reason was the Soviet disappointment in close DPRK-Chinese relations17.
The turning point
A new North Korean policy towards European Communist countries created 
opportunities to intensify contacts and cooperation. From the Polish point of 
view also the North Korean reaction to the introduction of Martial Law in Poland 
(December 13, 1981) was a significant factor. One week after implementation of 
the Martial Law, Kim Il Sung met with the Polish ambassador to North Korea, Leon 
Tomaszewski and expressed his standpoint. Kim claimed that the implementation of 
a state of emergency in a socialist country affected the working class and the nation, 
and meant that the ruling party had conducted a wrong economic and educational 
policy. After he had said that, he added that because of the counterrevolution, 
supported by the US propaganda, the implementation of the Martial Law was 
necessary. The following day, North Korea decided to give symbolic support 
through donation of 3 metric tons of wheat18. 
In spring 1984 Kim Il Sung made his second trip to European Communist 
countries. Officially North Korea declared that its purpose was to intensify contacts 
with those states, strengthen “brotherhood” and unite with them in “fight against 
war and imperialism”. European diplomats saw different reasons. First of all, Kim’s 
peregrination took place several months after the Rangoon bombing, so it was 
seen as a way of escaping international isolation. Secondly, North Korea needed 
15 Ibid. 
16 AMSZ, D. II, 29/87, w. 2, Pilna notatka, 3 V 1984.
17 AMSZ, D. II, 25/92, w. 4, Pilna notatka, 12 IX 1978; Ibid., Szyfrogram nr 8280, 
Warszawa, 25 IX 1978 r.
18 AMSZ, D. II, 43/86, w. 2, Szyfrogram ambasadora Leona Tomaszewskiego, Phenian 2 
I 1982. 
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economic aid because of its economic weakness and an impressive development of 
South Korea. What is more, probably DPRK wanted to build up its position in order 
to balance China’s influence when it seemed that the “Middle State” may become 
an important player in the discussion concerning the unification and future of the 
Korean Peninsula19. 
Kim Il Sung’s travel to Europe improved North Korean relations with the 
Soviet Union and other Communist states. One year after his visit, Polish diplomats 
in the Soviet Union were informed by specialists from the Far East Department of 
the USSR Foreign Ministry that Soviet-North Korean bilateral relations reached a 
new level20.
When it comes to Poland the visit, which took place in 27–29th of May 1984, 
also was a turning point21. Right after the departure of the delegation, the deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs evaluated all the meetings with North Koreans and 
notified that they fulfilled basic expectations. He underlined that Poland provided 
detailed information about the internal situation in the country and described the 
main interests of its foreign policy. Regarding international affairs, the Polish side 
stressed the value of collaboration with other Communist states, especially the 
significance of close relations with the Soviet Union. The Korean delegation limited 
its concern to three issues. They discussed DPRK’s achievements concerning the 
reinforcement of socialism, their view on the international aspects of the Korean 
issue and the cooperation with Poland, particularly in the field of economy. 
In the matter of economy Koreans repeated their proposal made during 
previous negotiations of an intensification of Polish involvement in North Korean 
coal mine industry. Furthermore, they presented a new request which was an idea of 
establishing a factory of MI-2 helicopters by Polish engineers. DPRK hoped for a 
factory that could produce 100 helicopters a year. When it comes to Poland requests, 
the main one was to import more North Korean mineral resources as magnesite, 
lead and zinc. At the same time Poles emphasized that in order to increase trade 
exchange it is essential to fulfill contracts on time and deliver high quality products. 
In past North Korea failed to meet obligations to Poland many times. 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski and Kim Il Sung decided that details of further 
economic cooperation should be discussed by special committee22 during a 
scheduled meeting in Pyongyang. Poland also agreed to a not scheduled visit of 
19 AMSZ, D. II, 29/87, w. 2, Pilna notatka, 3 V 1984.
20 AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Notatka z rozmowy tow. Burskiego, Szustera i Kramarza 
z wicedyrektorem I Dalekowschodniego Departamentu MID Morozowem nt. sytuacji na 
Półwyspie Koreańskim, Moskwa, 3 IV 1985. 
21 See more details about the visit: S. Szyc, “Wieczna braterska przyjaźń”. Oficjalna 
wizyta Kim Il Sunga w Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w maju 1984 roku, „Komunizm: 
system-ludzie-dokumentacja”, vol. 2, 2013, pp. 109–121. 
22 The Committee was set up on October 4, 1972 and had sessions alternately in Pyongyang 
and Warsaw. 
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Korean experts in factories of helicopters and factories producing coal mining 
equipment23. 
A Polish delegation for economic talks visited Pyongyang from 8–13 July, 
1984. Together with their North Korean partners they conferred about future plan 
and the Polish side confirmed that it was ready to: build a factory of helicopters, 
help in exploration of coal basin in Anju and provide machinery necessary for the 
construction of a rail freight wagon’s factory. However, there were still preliminary 
talks and no contracts were signed. 
It is worth noting that unexpectedly on the last day of their trip the Polish 
delegation was received by Kim Il Sung. He informed his interlocutors that he 
treated their visit as a positive result of his journey to Poland and that he appreciated 
that fact that the Poles came as the first delegation after his trip to Europe. He 
declared that he perceived this fact as a sign of friendship. Moreover, Kim asked to 
give his regards to general Jaruzelski and called him “brother and closest friend”24. 
Friendship and intensive cooperation
Despite ambitious plans in the following years economic cooperation was the 
weakest aspect of bilateral contacts. Year by year Polish ambassadors stressed this 
fact in their reports. The helicopters factory became a symbolic example of non-
realized ideas Even after signing the contract North Korea was not able to cover 
costs of its establishment. On the other hand, in spite of several problems, trade 
exchange increased significantly. Poland became DPRK’s third trade partner among 
10 Communist states after USSR and China. At the same time North Korea rose 
as Poland’s second biggest partner in Asia, after China25. What is more, the trade 
agreement signed for years 1986–1990 assumed that trade between both countries 
would grow 97% when compared with 1981–198526. 
Definitely political contacts were the real core of the mutual relations. Visible 
sign of its development was increasing number of exchanged delegations and 
its level. Beside a few exceptions, in previous decades North Korea and Poland 
23 AMSZ, D. II, 30/87, w. 5, Pilna notatka z wizyty delegacji partyjno-państwowej KRLD, 
pod przewodnictwem Sekretarza Generalnego KC Partii Pracy Korei, prezydenta Kim Ir Sena, 
27–29 maja 1984 r., Warszawa, 29 V 1984 r.; AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Notatka nt. stosunków 
polsko-koreańskich, Warszawa, 11 IV 1985 r. 
24 AMSZ, D. II, 30/87, w. 5, Informacja w sprawie ważniejszych ustaleń podjętych na 
VIII posiedzeniu Komisji Konsultatywnej do Spraw Gospodarczych i Naukowo-Technicznych 
między Rządem PRL a Rządem KRLD, Phenian, 8–13 lipiec 1984 r.; Ibidem, Notatka 
informacyjna dla Towarzysza gen. armii Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 
Warszawa, 18 VII 1984 r. 
25 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Propozycje do plany pracy ambasady PRL w Phenianie na 
1987 rok, Phenian, 22 X 1986 r.
26 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Informacja o stosunkach gospodarczych Polski z Koreańską 
Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną (stan z dnia 15 sierpnia 1986), Warszawa, 18 VIII 1986 r. 
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exchanged mainly low-level delegations. After second Kim Il Sung trip to Poland 
also a frequency of high-level meetings increased. For instance, from 23–29 April, 
1985, a member of the Politburo of the Worker’s Party of Korea, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam paid an official visit to Warsaw. He 
gave Kim Il Sung’s letter to general Jaruzelski and renewed an invitation to him to 
visit DPRK. Kim also met with the head of the State Council Henryk Jabłoński and 
invited him to North Korea. One of the main purposes of his visit was to introduce 
a North Korean proposal of signing a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement. Kim 
presented a draft of the agreement and expressed North Korean wish to sign a final 
version during Jaruzelski’s visit to North Korea. Furthermore, Kim participated in 
consultations with Polish diplomats led by Foreign Minister, Stefan Olszowski. 
The meeting resulted in enacting a two-year cooperation agreement between both 
ministries and a decision on the establishment of Polish-North Korean Friendship 
associations no later than to the end of 198527. 
Wojciech Jaruzelski decided that his trip to North Korea would take place in 
early autumn 1986. Due to his plans, Polish specialists were obliged to prepare a 
final draft of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with their North Korean 
partners. Before they accomplished this task, they had carefully studied similar 
agreements between North Korea and other countries. In December 1985 Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs provided an analysis examining cases of agreements signed by 
North Korea with USSR, China, Romania, Libya, Ethiopia, GDR, Bulgaria and 
Cuba28.
In the middle of 1986 the North Korean ambassador to Poland presented an 
additional DPRK’s proposal concerning Jaruzelski’s visit. The suggestion was to 
enact a long-term agreement for economic and scientific cooperation terminating 
in 2000. Poland rejected that idea because of not fulfilling its economic obligations 
by the DPRK and announced that short-term agreements would be more suitable29. 
A Polish delegation led by Wojciech Jaruzelski visited North Korea from 
24–28 September 1986. Among dozens of members there was also an informal 
second person in a ruling regime the Minister of Interior general Czesław Kiszczak. 
He was accompanied by trusted collaborators: chief of the Security Service gen. 
Władysław Ciastoń, head of the Citizen’s Militia gen. Józef Beim, director of 
counterintelligence service col. Janusz Sereda and chief of Kiszczak’s cabinet 
colonel Czesław Żmuda. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior were invited 
to North Korea by DPRK’s Minister of Public Security general Pek Hak Rim and 
27 AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Stefan Olszowski. Pilna notatka o wizycie członka Biura 
Politycznego KC PPK, wicepremiera i ministra Spraw Zagranicznych KRLD, Kim Jon Nama 
w Polsce, 23–29 kwietnia 1985, Warszawa, IV 1985.
28 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Notatka dot. charakterystyki Układów o Przyjaźni i Współpracy 
zawartych przez Koreańską Republikę Ludowo-Demokratyczną, Warszawa, 4 XII 1985 r. 
29 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Notatka o rozmowie z Ambasadorem KRL-D – Towarzyszem 
O Man Sok, Warszawa, 20 VI 1986. 
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part of their schedule was different from Jaruzelski’s program30. The North Korean 
Minister of Public Security had sent 3 invitations to Kiszczak which proves that he 
treated him as a very important person31. I will provide more information about the 
cooperation between both ministries in the further part of this paper. 
Except for ritual exchanges of courtesies, general Jaruzelski presented to 
Kim Il Sung goals of his trip to China that was scheduled for right after his visit 
to North Korea. He stressed that Poland wished to develop cooperation with PRC 
because conflicts inside the Eastern Bloc had negatively affected the Communist 
camp and had strengthened its enemies. Jaruzelski also expressed his wish of 
improving Sino-Soviet relations32. On the last day of the visit, Jaruzelski and 
Kim Il Sung signed an agreement which finally was named the Declaration of 
Friendship and Cooperation. What is more, representatives of Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs enacted the treaty on the provision of legal assistance in civil, 
family and criminal cases33. 
The visit was another step forward on the way to closer and more intensive 
relations. From 1986–1987 Poland sent about 280 delegates to DPRK. Sometimes 
these were political missions but there were also visits of artists, scholars and 
social activists. Such a number of delegation meant a radical change in comparison 
with the past years, even with early 1980’s. For example, in January 1981 the 
Counselor of North Korean Embassy in Poland presented the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs a list of 6 Polish delegations which DPRK was planning to 
receive in 1981.
When it comes to above mentioned 280 delegations from 1986–1987, it 
is worth to point out at least several of them. Among them was a delegation of 
the Polish Military with the Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief of 
General Staff gen. Józef Użycki as well as delegation led by the Deputy Marshal 
of the lower chamber of the Parliament, Mieczysław Rakowski. Also the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Marian Orzechowski came to Pyongyang. What is more, North 
Korea was visited by: representatives of the Polish-North Korean Friendship 
Association, professors from the Polish Academy of Sciences, a delegation of – 
subordinated to authorities – All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions with its chief, 
Alfred Miodowicz. Additionally, during 2 years „Orbis” travel agency arranged 
30 AIPN, 1585/1969, Protokół z pobytu delegacji Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych PRL 
w Koreańskiej Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej, Warszawa, 10 X 1986 r., p. 7. 
31 AIPN, 1585/1969, Notatka dot. wizyty Min. Spr. Wewn. PRL tow. gen. bron. Cz. Kiszczaka 
w KRLD w 1986 r., Warszawa, VI 1986, pp. 52–53. 
32 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Tezy do rozmów w „cztery oczy” z tow. Kim Ir Senem, 
Warszawa, 6 IX 1986 r. 
33 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Program organizacyjny partyjno-państwowej wizyty przyjaźni 
w Koreańskiej Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej I Sekretarza KC PZPR Przewodniczącego 
Rady Państwa PRL Generała Armii Towarzysza Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego 24-28 września 1986 
roku. 
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16 trips do DPRK. And furthermore, both countries agreed to receive chosen 
officials with their families on holiday. As a result of that deal, five members of the 
Politburo of the Polish United Worker’s Party together with their families spent 
their leisure time in Pyongyang. 
At the same time North Korea sent numerous delegations to Poland and among 
them many consisting of high-rank officials. Visits of Vice-President and member 
of the Politburo Ri Jong-ok as well as that of the Korean People’s Army’s Chief of 
the General Staff, O Kuk-ryol may be some illustrative examples. Naturally, there 
were also low-rank trips like those with North Korean journalists or youths and 
pioneers34. 
The second half of the 1980’s was a time of close cooperation between security 
apparatus of both countries. Since July 1983, regular exchange of delegations 
began. During first meetings Polish side shared its experience of struggles against 
democratic opposition. Koreans must have been impressed because they were 
especially interested in the equipment used by the Civil Militia in Poland. Upon 
their request Poles gave them several devices used by the Civil Militia as a „gift”. 
In May 1985 representatives of Polish Ministry of the Interior and North Korean 
Ministry of Public Security signed an agreement for a 4-year education of several 
North Korans in the Polish Main School of Fire Service. 
The above mentioned visit of the Polish Minister of the Interior, Czesław 
Kiszczak during Wojciech Jaruzelski’s official trip in September 1986 was a very 
significant event that helped to bolster bilateral ties between security institutions 
of Poland and North Korea. In July 1987 the Ministry led by Kiszczak signed an 
agreement for cooperation with the Ministry of State Security and in February 1989 
with the Ministry of Public Security of North Korea. The first agreement focused on 
sharing political, military and economic information about common enemies and 
cooperation on the counterintelligence field as well as struggle against international 
terrorism. The second one established experience-sharing in regard to fighting with 
criminal activities, money counterfeiting and drug-addictions35.  
In spite of very good political relations and close cooperation on security 
field in the second half of the 1980’s, there were permanent problems in the matter 
of economy. After some time it occurred again that North Korea was not able to 
fulfill part of its commitments on time. When in May 1988 Kim Yong-nam traveled 
to Poland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Marian Orzechowski expressed his 
disappointment about delivering only 4 thousand out of the expected 32 thousand 
34 AMSZ, D. II, 38/86, w. 4, Notatka informacyjna w sprawie wymiany osobowej polsko-
koreańskiej w 1981 r., Warszawa, 23 I 1981; AMSZ, D. II, 24/92, w. 8, Ocena realizacji ustaleń 
z wizyt na najwyższym szczeblu, 22 I 1988 r. 
35 P. Gasztold, Korean Peninsula in the Documents of the Polish Communist Security 
Services, [in] “Korea and Eastern Europe. Exploring the Past” ed. A. Fedotoff, S. Y. Kim, Sofia 
2017, p. 141. 
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tons of magnesite according to a contract for 1988. From Orzechowski’s point of 
view Polish-North Korean economic relations decreased anew36. 
Olympic Games and the XIII World Youth Festival
One of the most important issues discussed by Poles and North Korans many 
times in the 1980’s was the case of 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul. In 1981 
the International Olympics Committee chose Seoul as a host city of the Summer 
Olympic in 1988. Despite the opposition of Communist countries, including 
Poland, IOC confirmed its decision in December 1984. In the meantime, North 
Korea refused the idea of becoming a co-host of the Olympics although such a plan 
was put forward for consideration by Fidel Castro. Instead of following Castro’s 
proposal, DPRK preferred a strategy of persuading Communist states to boycott 
the Olympics. 
In spite of North Korean efforts, Poland made a preliminary decision to 
participate in the Olympic Games in Seoul very soon that is in March 1985. 
However North Koreans did not give up and continued their attempts to encourage 
Poland to revise its attitude. During numerous meetings, DPRK’s ambassador 
tried to persuade Polish officials to change their mind and boycott the Olympics. 
In order to reach his goal, he visited the Parliament, the Central Committee of 
the United Worker’s Party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several other 
institutions37. 
In late December 1984 ambassador O Man Sok expressed a strong statement 
on behalf of the North Korean regime. He announced that every country taking 
part in Seoul’s Olympics or supporting Seoul as a hosting city, would be 
perceived as DPRK’s enemy and such a position would be treated as an attack 
on North Korea38.
Not only the ambassador but also other North Korean figures exerted pressure 
on Poland. During his visit to Poland in April 1985 Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim 
Yong-nam tried to persuade general Jaruzelski to share North Korean stance. He 
claimed that Communist countries should not attend the Olympics because it would 
be no sport but a political event useful for “American imperialism”. Besides, he 
underlined that in case of the Los Angeles Olympics DPRK had showed solidarity 
with other Communist states and had not participated in the Olympics. In spite 
of the decision made a month before, Poland preferred to postpone announcing it 
36 AMSZ, D. II, 24/92, w. 8, Pilna notatka o wizycie oficjalnej w Polsce członka BP KC 
PPK, wicepremiera Rady Administracyjnej, ministra SZ KRLD Kim Jon Nam’a (5–7 maja 
1988 r.), Warszawa, 12 V 1988 r. 
37 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Problemy Igrzysk Olimpijskich w 1986 roku (notatka 
informacyjna), Warszawa, 26 VIII 1986 r. 
38 AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Notatka informacyjna z rozmowy z ambasadorem KRL-D, O 
Man Sok przeprowadzonej 22 bm. na jego prośbę, Warszawa, 24 XII 1984 r. 
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to North Korea. Instead of that Kim Yong-nam was informed that Poland would 
debate about the issue with other European Communist states39. 
Indeed, in following months Poland exchanged views about Seoul Olympics 
with its European partners, which resulted in a conclusion that a boycott of the 
Olympics would be a mistake. For instance, in August 1985 general secretary of 
the Hungarian Olympic Committee Pál Schmitt stated that the boycott of the Los 
Angeles Olympics had negative consequences and that Communist countries should 
not do the same in regard to the upcoming Olympics. Moreover, Schmitt informed 
the Poles that Hungarian officials were irritated by constant North Korea’s appeals40. 
Probably the failure of initial North Korean strategy was one of factors that 
caused a verification of its attitude. In summer 1985 Deputy Prime Minister of 
DPRK sent a letter to heads of Communist states and declared that North Korea 
was ready to co-host the Olympics41. Poland supported that idea. However, several 
meetings of representatives of both Korean states did not give positive results. Effect 
could not have been different due to North Korean maximalist demands concerning 
the number of sport events that DPRK wanted to host. Other Communist states 
interpreted DPRK’s attitude as considered tactics which goal was to force South 
Korea to reject North Korean stance. DPRK’s elites were aware that its economy 
was too weak and there was lack of time to prepare the country for co-hosting 
the Olympics. Nevertheless, the regime preferred to push South Korea to refuse 
cooperation than admit DPRK’s failure42.
When North Korea realized it was impossible to prevent the Olympic Games 
in Seoul, a decision was made to respond in a different way. In February 1987, the 
International Preparation Committee for the World Youth and Student Festival agreed 
to hold the 13th World Youth Festival in Pyongyang in 1-8 July 1989. Soon after this 
decision North Korea sent delegations to Communist countries in Eastern Europe to 
ask for support, credits and buy technology. According to Bernd Schaefer’s findings, 
East Germany seemed to be the most important partner in that regard43. Nevertheless, 
North Koreans asked for help also other countries, among them Poland. 
39 AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Stefan Olszowski. Pilna notatka o wizycie członka Biura 
Politycznego KC PPK, wicepremiera i ministra Spraw Zagranicznych KRLD, Kim Jon Nama 
w Polsce, 23–29 kwietnia 1985, Warszawa, IV 1985. 
40 AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Notatka informacyjna ze spotkania 8 sierpnia br. Z 
wiceprzewodniczącym Węgierskiego Komitetu Kultury Fizycznej i Sportu tow. Palem 
Schmittem, Warszawa, 9 VIII 1985 r. 
41 AMSZ, D. II, 22/89, w. 6, Problemy Igrzysk Olimpijskich w 1986 roku (notatka 
informacyjna), Warszawa, 26 VIII 1986 r.
42 AMSZ, D. II, 24/92, w. 8, Pilna notatka dot. udziału Polski w XXIV Igrzyskach 
Olimpijskich 1988 r. w Seulu – w dniach 17 września – 2 października 1988 r., Warszawa, 17 
II 1988 r. 
43 B. Schaefer, North Korea and the East German Stasi, 1987–1989 https://www.wilsoncenter.
org/blog-post/north-korea-and-the-east-german-stasi–1987–1989 (read: 10 II 2018).
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In January 1989, a delegation of Polish security apparatus together with 
representatives of state security organs from North Korea, USSR, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Cuba took part in a meeting in Pyongyang where 
they discussed ways of maintaining security during the Festival. After the 
consultation Poles received a long list of sophisticated equipment that North Korea 
wanted to buy in 1989–1990 and a shorter list of equipment that they wished to 
receive for free or borrow in order to use them during the Festival. The second list 
presented devices produced in West Germany: 5 explosives detectors, 2 detectors 
of improvised explosive devices and mines and 2 X-ray detectors44. Moreover, in 
June 1989 two North Korean special agents came do Warsaw in order to supervise 
the vetting of foreign students attending the Festival45. Not only security institutions 
were asked for help. DPRK also wanted Poland to educate (and cover the costs of 
this education) 15 young Koreans in the field of interpreting. They wanted 10 of 
them to become Russian-Korean interpreters and 5 French-Korean interpreters46. 
The Festival was a large scale event with 13 thousand participants from 173 
countries.  Almost everything went according to DPRK’s plan which meant that the 
“Great Leader”, the Juche ideology as well as one and only South Korean student 
who attended the Festival, were in the center of attention. On the other hand, North 
Korea successfully blocked any discussion about troubling issues like violence of 
human rights and did not let Amnesty International attend the event47. 
After the end of the Festival, North Korea described it as a great success. 
At the same time the Polish Embassy in Pyongyang presented it differently. An 
opinion sent to Warsaw was based on their own observations and on an exchange of 
thoughts with foreign diplomats serving in DPRK. The author of the report written 
in early August 1989 predicted that the Festival would be an accelerator of mental 
changes in the North Korean society48. Today we know that the event did not start 
political reforms. But what we can say for sure, that huge expenses connected with 
preparations to the Festival resulted in a widespread impoverishment of ordinary 
North Koreans49.
44 AIPN, 1585/1569, Pismo płk. Czesława Żmudy do Ambasadora PRL w Phenianie 
Mieczysława Dedo, Warszawa, 30 V 1988 r., k. 194–195.  
45 P. Gasztold, Korean Peninsula in…, p. 153. 
46 AMSZ, D. II, 4/94, w. 2, Notatka informacyjna. Węzłowe problemy Światowego 
Festiwalu Młodzieży i Studentów w Phenianie w 1989 r., Phenian, 17 IX 1987 r. 
47 AMSZ, D. II, 3/94, w. 3, Szyfrogram Nr 0-389/III, Phenian, 10 VII 1989 r. 
48 AMSZ, D. II, 3/94, w. 3, Szyfrogram Nr 0-1576/III, Phenian, 4 VIII 1989 r. 
49 AMSZ, D. II, 4/94, w. 2, Warunki życia ludności Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowo-
Demokratycznej (z rozmów z radcami i I sekretarzami ambasad Bułgarii, Czechosłowacji, 
Egiptu, Jugosławii, Palestyny, Węgier i ZSRR, Phanian, X 1989. 
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The problem of South Korea
Another significant issue affecting Polish-North Korean relations in the 
1980’s, was the South Korean policy towards European Communist countries. Its 
shape had genesis in events that had happened in the previous decade. In the early 
1970’s both Koreas started a dialogue about unification but the reasons that pushed 
them to that step were completely different. On one hand, North Korean strategy of 
1966–1969, based on escalation of conflict with the South, failed. In the aftermath 
of the so called “Second Korean War” no revolution broke out in South Korea but 
an absolutely opposite situation occurred. The ruling regime of Park Chung-hee 
became more popular among society and his anticommunist politics gained more 
supporters. 
On the other hand President Park Chung-hee perceived the Nixon Doctrine 
and his politics towards China as dangerous for South Korean security. Element 
of detente that mostly influenced South Korea was a decision taken in July, 1970. 
According to it the USA reduced its military forces on the Korean Peninsula from 
62 thousand to 20 thousand. 
In such circumstances South Korea started a dialogue with the DPRK which in 
following years resulted in many negotiations and plans for unification submitted 
by both sides50. At the same time South Korean authorities, which believed that 
political power follows economic power, started looking for new markets for South 
Korean export. Communist countries in Europe seemed to be promising markets. 
On December 31, 1970 South Korea revised the Trade Act of 1967 which initially 
had prohibited trade with the socialist zone. After the revision of the Act, the trade 
became allowed51. 
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs carefully monitored South Korean 
efforts to establish links with Poland. First of them were noticed in early 1970’s. 
South Koreans tried to build ties in several different ways. First of all, their diplomats 
initiated contacts with Polish diplomats in countries where both states had their 
embassies, such as USA and Belgium. Secondly, South Korean citizens were sent 
to join international events as conferences and sport tournaments in Poland. And 
last but not least, South Korea mailed to Polish libraries and research institutions 
propaganda materials52.
Regardless of their character, Polish authorities perceived all this moves as a 
planned strategy to encourage Poland to establish relationships with South Korea. 
50 G. Strnad, Korea. Polityka Południa wobec Północy w latach 1948–2008. Zmiana i 
kontynuacja, Poznan 2014, pp. 188-204.
51 Bogook Kim, The Diplomatic Relationship between Hungary and South Korea: 1948–
1982, [in] “Korea and Eastern Europe. Exploring the Past”, Sofia 2017, p. 23.  
52 AMSZ, D. II, 29/87, w. 2, Zestawienie znanych Departamentowi II faktów dot. kontaktów 
Korei Płd. Z Polską oraz incydentów z dyplomatami KRLD w Warszawie, Warszawa, 24 V 
1976 r. 
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In the 1970’ Poland was definitely against that idea and tried to block or at least 
limit contacts of Poles and South Koreans. The only case when Polish officials 
agreed to such contacts were important international events.
North Korea constantly observed South Korean efforts to build links with 
Poland and its citizens. Every time the North Korean embassy learned that 
someone from South Korea planned to visit Poland, its diplomats met with Polish 
officials and tried to convince them to not let South Koreans enter Poland. They 
did it in any case: in regard to scientific conferences, sport tournaments, even The 
International Chopin Piano Competition53. Moreover, DPRK’s embassy regularly 
requested Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prevent trips of Polish citizens 
to South Korea. Furthermore, there were cases when the North Korean embassy 
expressed disappointment with the way Polish press wrote about South Korea. In 
result, in 1980 the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended using the term 
“so called” in reference to South Korean authorities and specific posts they hold, 
for instance, the so called Prime Minister of South Korea54. 
The Polish attitude towards South Korea changed in the middle of the 1980’s. 
Poland alike other European Communist countries started to perceive South 
Korea as a potential trade partner and investor. From the Polish point of view it 
was especially important because of the economic crisis and implementation of 
American economic sanctions in response to the Martial Law. In September 1987 
Poland decided to modify its position on contacts with South Korea. Since that time 
cooperation in the field of economic, trade, science, culture and sport was allowed. 
What is more, Poland implemented a more liberal visa policy in regard to contacts 
with South Korea and let Polish ships enter the Pusan harbor as well as allowed 
for repairing of Polish ships in South Korean shipyards. Another meaningful step 
was the opening of a branch office of the Polish-Japanese “Agropol” company in 
Seoul55. 
After that Poland considered building closer links and conducted unofficial 
negotiations with South Korean politicians and businessmen. In this matter the 
Polish participation in the Seoul Olympics appeared to be a useful tool. During 
the Olympics Deputy Director of the Second Department of the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Majkowski and the head of the Polish Olympic 
Committee, Aleksander Kwaśniewski held talks with representatives of the South 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Korean Trade Promotion Agency. It was 
another step for better mutual understanding and discussing future plans. Several 
53 AMSZ, D. II, 25/88, w. 6, Zapis rozmowy wiceministra SZ tow. J. Majewskiego z 
Ambasadorem KRLD O Man Sok, Warszawa, 28 V 1985 r. 
54 AMSZ, D. II, 28/85, w. 5, Notatka z rozmowy z ambasadorem KRLD tow. O Un 
Gwonem, przeprowadzonej z jego inicjatywy 26 lutego 1980, Warszawa 29 II 1980 r. 
55 AMSZ., D. II, 24/92, w. 8, Notatka dot. stosunków Polski z Koreą Południową, 
Warszawa, 8 XI 1988 r. 
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months after the Olympics, the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade set up its office in 
Seoul and KOTRA opened its office in Warsaw56. 
The next round of secret negotiations took place in Warsaw and concerned 
establishing of diplomatic relations between both countries. In the decisive round of 
talks South Korea was represented by deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hong Soon 
Yung who promised a 400 million dollars credit for 5 years. After that declaration the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended establishing diplomatic relations 
with South Korea to the Polish authorities57. When Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner 
studied that opinion, he approved the recommendation and wrote that recognition of 
South Korea would be useful for preserving economic interests of Poland58. Finally 
both countries established diplomatic relations on November 1, 1989.  
North Korea made last-minute efforts to stop Poland from recognizing the South. 
To demonstrate disappointment with Polish plans, DPRK withdrew its ambassador 
only two years after the beginning of his service in Poland59. After this move Polish 
diplomats in Pyongyang started to consider other possible North Korean steps. 
Only 10 days before the recognition of South Korea, the Polish embassy sent an 
opinion based on conversations with foreign diplomats to Warsaw. They forecasted 
three possible ways of North Korea’s behavior. According to this, the most radical 
politicians may have advised Kim Il Sung to attack Polish diplomats in Seoul or the 
South Korean in Warsaw. Fortunately, that scenario was not implemented60. 
Another step made 10 days before the recognition of South Korea was a direct 
request of Kim Il Sung to Wojciech Jaruzelski. Via Polish ambassador the “Great 
Leader” asked Poland to change its intention or at least postpone for half a year 
official announcement concerning establishment of relations with South Korea61. 
His efforts were also pointless. 
A few weeks after the recognition of South Korea, DPRK forced all its students, 
PhD students and interns to leave Poland. The North Korean Embassy received such 
an order on December 5, 1989 and on December 14 a group of 103 young Koreans left 
Poland by a chartered plane without the majority of their belongings. Officially North 
Korea claimed that the reason was a threat of kidnapping them by South Korea62. 
56 A. Majkowski, Geneza nawiązania stosunków dyplomatycznych między Polską a 
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Despite the above mentioned moves, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
considered North Korean reaction as calm, especially in comparison to the previous 
reaction on the recognition of South Korea by Hungary63. It was probably a result 
of several reasons. Before anything else, Poland was not the first state of the 
Eastern Block that established relationships with Republic of Korea. What is more, 
Polish communists did their best to ease the situation. A telling example may be an 
unprecedented meeting of the withdrawn North Korean ambassador with President 
Wojciech Jaruzelski64. And last but not least, DPRK’s uncertainty and a lack of 
understanding of deep political changes in the Eastern Block was also a significant 
factor. Several days after the establishment of Polish-South Korean relations the 
Polish embassy in Pyongyang informed Warsaw that North Korean officials in 
their conversations with Romanian, Albanian and Cuban diplomats expressed an 
opinion that Poland stopped to be a Communist country only for short period of 
time. They believed that after the 11th Congress of United Workers Party Polish 
communists would regain their strength and defeat “agents of imperialism”. What 
is more, they supposed that „creeping revolutions” in Hungary and GDR would 
face the same fate65. After some time North Korea realized the real nature of East 
European revolutions. That is why the relationships with democratic Poland worsen 
and mutual distrust arose. 
Conclusion
The decade of the 1980’s was one of the most turbulent period in bilateral 
relations of Poland and North Korea. After dozens of years of stagnancy Kim 
Il Sung’s visit of 1984 became a turning point. Since that time both countries 
strengthened ties and intensified contacts on many fields. Nevertheless, fruitful 
cooperation between both countries was stopped by the end of the Cold War and 
the transition of Poland. The recognition of South Korea was a symbolic change 
in Polish foreign policy towards Eastern Asia. In the aftermath, in following years 
South Korea became one of the biggest investors in Poland and at the same time 
there were not many fields of cooperation with DPRK. 
63 North Korea not only withdrew its ambassador from Hungary but also expelled 
Hungarian envoy. 
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